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Abstract 
Post-Cold War efforts to knit together human rights and international humanitarian law 
in pursuit of tougher arms transfer control reached their apogee in the UN Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT). In contrast to dominant accounts based on human security norms, I argue 
that a key effect of the ATT is to legitimise liberal forms of militarism. During 
negotiations, the US and UK governments justified their arms export practices in terms 
of morality, responsibility and legitimacy. And more broadly their arms transfer 
practices are explained away by reference to national regulatory regimes that exceed 
the standards set out in the ATT. Arms transfers to Egypt and intra-western transfers 
illustrate the way these justifications and regimes serve to shield US-UK weapons 
transfers and use from scrutiny and accountability. Rather than signalling the victory of 
human security, the ATT is better understood as facilitating the mobilisation of 
legitimacy for contemporary liberal forms of war-fighting and war-preparation. 
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In the run-up to the final United Nations (UN) conference negotiating an Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT) in early 2013, UK Foreign Minister William Hague warned those 
states yet to commit to the treaty: ǲhistory will judge you harshly if you miss this 
moment.ǳ1 This invocation of the historical responsibility at stake in the effort to agree a 
universal, legally binding treaty to regulate conventional arms transfers was amplified 
when the overwhelming treaty vote on 2 April 2013 was met in the UN General Assembly with ǲa burst of sustained applause.ǳ2 Treaty commentator and scholar 
Matthew Bolton gave congratulations to civil society and kudos to small and middle powers, and to the US ǲfor doing the right thing in the end.ǳ Together, ǲcrucial norms 
against profiting from the sale of killing machines to those who abuse human rights and humanitarian lawǳ have been established.3 The treaty entered into force in December 
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2014, requiring state parties to regulate their weapons transfers with reference to arms 
embargoes, illicit trafficking, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, peace and 
security, international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), 
terrorism, transnational crime, and gender-based violence. 
In this article I argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging 
assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the ATT is the legitimation of liberal forms 
of militarism exercised by major western states. It is not simply that these states have long been amongst the worldǯs largest military spenders, arms producers and arms 
exporters, and claim the ATT will bring no new responsibilities for them. The same 
applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as Russia and, 
increasingly, China. There is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making 
and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. There is a 
distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification 
based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers 
as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. Arms transfers by liberal 
states that contribute to violations of human rights and IHL are hidden from view by the 
existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and IHL. 
This legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the ATT in the 
way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights 
violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of 
the latter. With the effect of naturalising liberal statesǯ practices and allowing them to 
evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect 
leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and 
violence, the ATT takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and 
relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism. 
In what follows, I first situate the treaty empirically, set out the emerging 
scholarly assessment of it based on human security norms, and advance as an 
alternative the concept of liberal militarism. Second, I analyse the similarities and 
differences in forms of justification by the USA and the UK.  As an ambivalent sceptic-
turned-supporter of the treaty, the US engaged in more unilateralist forms of 
justification than the UK, which was a major champion of the treaty.  However, both statesǯ engagements with the treaty share a framing based on a universalising moral 
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responsibility. Two cases – arms transfers to Egypt during the Arab Spring, and intra-
western transfers – are then used to illustrate the ways in which the US and UK 
governments justify their arms transfers by reference to regulatory regimes that include 
explicit reference to IHRL and IHL: regimes that are deemed to already exceed the 
standards of the ATT. Whilst transfers to the Middle East during the Arab Spring were 
used by proponent non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as an illustration of why an 
ATT is needed, intra-western transfers are generally not on the arms transfer control 
agenda. More broadly, claims around the need for tighter arms trade regulation revolve 
around an armed violence agenda, primarily in Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America. 
Analysing a Middle Eastern and an intra-western case helps us think harder about the 
broader purposes of arms transfer regulation. The existence of transfer regimes that 
already exceed the standards of the ATT creates a paradox in which contemporary risk 
transfer militarism is justified by reference to arms export licensing processes that are 
themselves based on risk assessment. Rather than signalling the success of human 
security norms then, the effort to use criteria- and risk-based assessments of arms 
transfers – the core of the ATT – is better understood as having been mobilised as part 
of the legitimation of contemporary liberal forms of militarism. There is, as yet, no 
negotiating history of the ATT. This article combines analysis of statesǯ official 
statements and expert commentary from observers of the process with off-the-record 
discussions with US-UK state and civil society participants in the treaty negotiations as a 
contribution to understanding the dynamics of the treaty negotiation process and early 
implementation phase.  
Theorising the ATT: from human security norms to liberal militarism  
The ATT brings together statesǯ existing obligations under international law in 
the form of express prohibitions that are binding on importers and exporters (Article 6), 
and sets standards for regulatory practice in the form of national risk assessments to 
bind exporters (Article 7). )ts goal is to address ǲthe security, social, economic and 
humanitarian consequences of the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional armsǳ 
whilst protecting the ǲlegitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests 
of States.ǳ4 As with other arms transfer control regimes, the ǲillicitǳ trade is 
simultaneously an organising term of the ATT and never defined in the treaty text.5 The 
combination of existing obligations under international law with human rights 
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standards to be enshrined in national regulatory systems is envisaged by proponents to 
render irresponsible transfers illegal.6 This was resisted by some southern states who 
saw it as a political move to delegitimise their practices whilst facilitating western 
ones.7 
The idea for the treaty originated in the 1990s with NGO campaigners and a 
group of Nobel Peace Laureates and was taken up by states via the UN system. A loose 
coalition of European and Southern states, most notably in Latin America and Sub 
Saharan Africa, working in alliance with the Control Arms NGO campaign, took on the role of ǲregional championsǳ of the treaty and worked together as a ǲlike-mindedǳ 
group,8 building on the regional ǲminilateralismǳ of initiatives such as the Nairobi 
Protocol9 and existing national and international regimes such as the EU Common 
Position on Arms Exports. A series of technical criticisms have been levelled at the 
scope,10 clarity and force of the final treaty text,11 including the absence of an 
enforcement mechanism.12 And diplomatic obstacles to the implementation of the 
treaty remain: key exporting and importing states such as Russia, China and India have 
not signed it; the US has signed but is unlikely to ratify any time soon. However, other 
statesǯ widespread enthusiasm for the treaty vote translated into rapid entry into force 
twenty one months after being agreed at the General Assembly.  
The emerging scholarly assessment of the ATT is clear that international action 
to regulate the arms trade is an ǲunprecedented effortǳ at norm creation13 and ǲone of 
the most ambitious and difficult goals to achieve in global governance.ǳ14 It grows out of 
existing arms control, disarmament and arms transfer control regimes. Extant  arms 
control or disarmament regimes that ban  specific technologies such as landmines, 
cluster munitions, chemical and nuclear weapons,  have all relied on their being framed 
as indiscriminate, inhumane, unacceptable or pariah in some way, thus challenging statesǯ abilities to produce, use or transfer them as part of legitimate military need and 
state security practice.15 The difficulty with regulating the conventional arms trade as a 
whole, as the ATT attempts to do, is that it does not lend itself to such framing due to  
the centrality of the arms trade to state security and sovereignty, and hence widespread 
legitimacy.16 Any multilateral action on the trade in conventional weapons as a whole 
thus has to take the form of regulation rather than abolition or a ban.  
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The ATT is both emblematic of, and distinct from, the post-Cold War non-
proliferation paradigm.17 For example, there is specific mention of terrorism as an ill to 
be combated, and a framing around the ǲillicit and unregulatedǳ trade; yet it applies to a 
broad range of military equipment, and does not generate a taboo or ban on particular 
types of technologies. As such, it may be able to serve to draw attention to the patterns of civilian death and injury ǲassociated with technologies considered Ǯnormalǯ or the use of which is somehow seen as Ǯinevitableǯ.ǳ18 One way this is envisaged is through 
inclusion not only of the laws of war under existing IHL, but also the inclusion of human 
rights provisions. This human security content of the treaty secured widespread 
agreement, with the reduction of human suffering explicitly named as a goal of the 
treaty.  
 The treaty means different things to the various constituencies involved in the 
campaign and negotiating processes; indeed, this was a necessary condition for its 
agreement. It is as much about trade regulation (according to supportive government 
and industry representatives) as arms transfer control (as most proponent NGOs would 
have it), with only minority voices ȋsuch as the Womenǯs )nternational League for Peace 
and Freedom, WILPF) articulating a disarmament agenda. And this is quite aside from 
the vocal hostility of US-based campaign groups and think-tanks such as the National 
Rifle Association (NRA) and Heritage Foundation on unilateralist and Second 
Amendment grounds, and the scepticism (e.g. China, India and Russia) and opposition 
(e.g. Iran, North Korea and Syria) of some non-western states on substantive and/or 
procedural grounds.19 Overall, the treaty represents the ǲconfluence of arms control, 
security, human rights, trade, armed violence, sovereignty, development, self-defence, 
technology, and other issuesǳ20 and its widely-drawn provisions ǲmust be applied in an 
innumerable number of different factual contexts … which take shape as the treaty is applied in practice.ǳ21 As experience from international action on small arms has shown, 
the problems posed by the arms trade are of a different character in different parts of 
the world: small arms are an issue of recirculation post-conflict in West Africa, of 
excessive stocks in southeast Europe, and of criminal activity and drug trafficking in 
Latin America and the CARICOM region.22 And notes of caution have been sounded by 
more radical campaign groups: to ensure the ATT makes a difference, states, civil society and UN ǲmust avoid legitimising further the international arms trade and 
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irresponsible transfers.ǳ23 But limits of the treaty aside, most agree that ǲwe have to start somewhereǳ and push for ǲrobust interpretation and effective implementation.ǳ24  
The ATT is seen by proponents as a step forward in the development of norms 
around the protection of human security, and potentially generative of a norm cascade 
such that it will have an effect even on non-signatories.25  This chimes with the academic 
literature on norms, which makes the case for the possibility of moral progress in 
international politics and a rising tide of principled action. The UK government is seen 
as having ǲhumanitarian, developmental and moral justificationsǳ or ǲmotivationsǳ for 
exercising leadership on the ATT, according to norms scholar Denise Garcia.26 As an example of ǲdisarmament diplomacyǳ, the ATT signals the way in which the rise of 
norms based on moral concerns can change conduct in international politics:27 ǲThe 
creation of new international norms transforms deeply held practices and changes behaviour.ǳ28 This is resonant with a common theme within the constructivist norms 
literature that norms co-exist with and sometimes trump material and strategic 
concerns, requiring a move beyond interest-based explanations.29 As Price puts it, ǲalmost any international treaty dealing with subjects such as human rights or war 
would seem to be a mix of the brutal bargaining of national interests and coercion 
sprinkled, if not always enveloped, with other, including moral, considerations.ǳ30 At 
first blush, then, we cannot understand the entry into force of the ATT without the role 
of human security norms.  
However, whilst the circulation of norms around human security was a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the agreement and content of the treaty, the 
character of the explanation given by a constructivist norms account is limited. Norms 
are supposed to facilitate more progressive standards of behaviour through, for 
example, the ǲrhetorical entrapment and shaming involved in hypocrisyǳ and a 
constructivist approach is supposed to illuminate the ǲnuances of progressive and regressive effects of even strategically moral uses of morality.ǳ31  But existing norms-
based accounts of the ATT have taken at face value the moral representations of leading 
liberal states, as seen in Garciaǯs equation of justifications with motivations.32 And 
broader constructivist accounts of weapons activism have not tackled the ongoing 
patterns across the spectrum of weapons transfers, outside of the banning of specific 
technologies. Carpenterǯs insightful analysis of the question of why some weapons 
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systems are targeted for delegitimation and not others brackets the wider system of 
war preparation of which the development of weapons systems is a part.33 
Constructivist arguments implicitly assume that progressive change in the area of 
weapons issues can come from delegitimating one technology at a time. Yet broader 
systems of war preparation and war fighting will always generate new technologies. And as ) argue later, liberal statesǯ war practices are kept off the agenda through risk 
assessment processes and legitimating claims based on a universalising morality. 
Claims about the normative power of conventional arms transfer control regimes 
have been sternly tested by empirical studies. Studies of patterns of arms exports 
demonstrate how the ǲself-declared ethical turnǳ of major western arms suppliers in the 
1990s has not acted as a bar on weapons exports.34 The US and Western European states ǲhave generally not exercised export controls so as to discriminate against human 
rights abusing or autocratic countries during the post-Cold War period.ǳ35  At best, the 
effect of the EU Code of Conduct, which served as one of the templates for the ATT, has been that ǲEU members no longer appear to reward poor human rights with arms 
transfers, even if they are not punishing it either.ǳ36 And in specific cases such as EU 
member statesǯ arms transfers to Libya, evidence demonstrates comprehensive 
violation of export control principles even though exporting governments were aware 
of the risks posed by transfers: licence denials "constitute exceptions in an overall 
export-friendly environment.ǳ37 
These empirical patterns raise the question of how liberal states manage to both 
transfer weapons to human rights violating and authoritarian regimes, and claim the 
mantle of responsibility by being publicly in favour of the ATT. The empirical studies 
cited above tend to adopt a realist explanation in which seemingly normatively 
progressive regimes serve as rhetorical cover for material or strategic interests,38 yet 
they do not go into detail as to how that process works. Realist explanations are 
inadequate because they fail to take into account the hard work that such rhetoric 
performs or the way that regimes function often despite the good intention of some 
proponents.39 Law and regulation are not merely superficial cover, a distraction from a focus on the advancement of material interests: law ǲdoes matter; that is both the 
problem and the promise.ǳ40 Thus whilst constructivists are right that rationalist 
assumptions of narrowly instrumental behaviour are false,41 they do not give an 
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adequate explanation of  the significance of the morally oriented work that is going on 
in the ATT: the ways in which a seemingly progressive initiative contains the seeds of its 
own complicity in broader systems of preparation for war and violence. Yet Price does 
point to how, ǲif hypocrisy becomes too endemic then it may undercut the power of the moral legitimacy more generally that is required for hypocrisyǯs piggy-back effects.ǳ42 
So it may be that arms transfers are so embedded in hypocrisy that normative shaming 
is less effective. As Erickson argues, ǲthe ATT faces a hard road aheadǳ: ǲwithout the 
means to expose and punish noncompliance, … [ambitious policies] do little more than enhance statesǯ reputations without improving human rights and conflict conditions on 
the ground.ǳ43 Yet ǲResearch explaining major suppliersǯ support for Ǯresponsibleǯ arms 
export controls is lacking.ǳ44 –To start thinking about this gap between commitment and compliance, and to explain major suppliersǯ positions, I advance the concept of liberal 
militarism. This moves beyond arguments based on hypocrisy and instrumental or 
functional pursuit of material interests, in order to explain key effects of the treaty in 
ways other approaches cannot. The normalization and legitimation of liberal ways of 
war and war preparation via the ATT are an important component of contemporary 
militarism.   
The concept of militarism, understood as the social and international relations of 
the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political violence,45 allows us to examine 
the historical, socio-economic and political sources and character of military power.46  
Understood this way, the concept goes beyond a definition of militarism as ideology, 
and militarisation as the material process through which militarism comes about. 
Militarism includes an ideological component but is not restricted to it, because war and 
armed violence can be justified and facilitated even if not necessarily glorified; and 
because social forces beyond ideology are required to produce it. Arms transfers and 
arms transfer control may thus contribute to militarisation (an increase in the intensity 
of military power in society, whether domestic or international), demilitarisation (a 
decrease), or a change in the character of militarism. The concept allows for the analysis 
of the different forms across space and time taken by war and preparation for it.47 And 
whilst the number of deaths caused by the arms trade is clearly an important yardstick, 
a militarism frame goes beyond numbers. Rather, it captures the influence of military 
relations on social relations in general, and the ways that war and armed violence are 
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prepared for. This requires broadening the empirical focus beyond conflict in Africa and 
organized crime in Latin America, which have been the main focus for arms transfer 
control.   
Scholars are increasingly challenging the long- and widely cherished belief that 
liberalism and militarism are antithetical.48 Key features of the specificity of liberal 
militarism include the capital- and technology-intensive character of the preparation for 
and conduct of war; a strong commitment to military production across war and 
peacetime and self-understanding as a primarily ǲeconomic, industrial and commercial power;ǳ the distanced form of attacks on Southern populations and simultaneous 
containment of social conflict at home and policing empire abroad, often featuring 
supposedly ǲsmallǳ massacres; a universalist ideology and conception of world order; 
low levels of military participation by society; and a state-capital relation that is 
formally separate but organically related.49 Justifications based on values and morals 
promoting human rights and humanitarian values are central to legitimating these 
features of liberal militarism, and are in contrast to the justifications based on 
sovereignty of other major, non-liberal suppliers and recipients such as Russia, China 
and India. In the case of the ATT, language and regulatory bureaucratic practices of risk 
assessment are embedded in western, liberal regimes that on paper already exceed the 
standards set out in the ATT.  
More generally, the turn to law has been central to the development of liberal 
militarism. The laws of war serve a legitimizing effect for western ways of war, pre-
empting criticism through reassurance, shielding acts and practices from criticism, and 
giving rhetorical protection from challenge, which serves to naturalise and normalise 
the prevailing distribution of power. 50 And the combination of human rights and IHL 
has served to criminalize low-tech violence and legitimate high-tech forms of war.51 The turn to law is ǲproductive of the social and political context that makes possible certain forms of war and certain relations of hierarchy,ǳ as the ǲperceived compliance with the 
law itself is partly productive of the global order in which contemporary war occurs.ǳ52 
This allows liberal states to pitch their practice in terms of responsibility, morality and 
legitimacy. Overall, then, whilst it is inappropriate to claim that legal regimes are mere 
instruments of the powerful, it is also too strong to say that humanitarian security regimes such as the ATT operate ǲin opposition to the aspirations of the most powerful 
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states.ǳ53 What is at stake, rather, is the legitimation of specific forms of war fighting and 
war preparation.  
     
From arms trade regulation to risk-transfer militarism  
The UK government was the first major exporter to express public support for 
the ATT, in March 2005, becoming a key champion of the treaty, bringing ǲpolitical force 
and credibilityǳ54 to the campaign. UK industry came on board a year later as a way to 
level the playing field and UK-based NGOs were central to the Control Arms campaign, 
which was funded and supported to a considerable extent by the UK government.55 In 
contrast, the USA was the only state to vote against the July 2006 and January 2009 UN 
Resolutions.56 It was not until October 2009 (under the Obama administration) that the 
US voted in favour of the negotiating process under Resolution 64/48. For British treaty 
participants, getting the USA on board was crucial57 and involved dialogue with the US 
to get it to a position where it could support the treaty.58 The US government was never a leader in the negotiations but over time shifted to ǲrefrain from serving as an impediment to progress.ǳ59 Once this shift happened, the US position was pitched in 
terms of how the ATT allows the US to promote its standards universally, using 
language of responsibility and legitimate trade.60 And the US delegation insisted on key 
procedural conditions such as consensus as the mechanism for decision-making,61 as a 
means to control the agenda. In this light, the roots of the ATT – in addition to the 
human security agenda – include the USǯ )nternational Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act 
of 1999, which required the President to begin negotiations towards an international 
code of conduct for arms sales62; and the related 2000 US-EU Declaration in 
Responsibility in Arms Exports, in which they publicly espoused the importance of ǲresponsibility, transparency and restraint.ǳ63 These other politico-economic sources of 
impetus for multilateral action promote the shared goal of bringing China and other 
emerging suppliers into a common regulatory regime, to prevent undercutting.64   
There are similarities and differences in forms of justification between the US 
and UK. The UK government was more explicitly moral about the ATT and the need to 
build multilateralism and international law; yet both governments framed their 
approach in terms of responsibility. Key features of the UK position were pride in Britainǯs role ȋwhether via the government or NGOsȌ acting as an early champion of the 
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treaty65 and the governmentǯs early adoption of it.66 The government made both a moral 
case for the need for a treaty67 and set out its compatibility with promoting arms 
exports: for the UK government, the treaty serves to plug gaps in the patchwork of 
national and regional regulatory regimes, and to level the playing field for British 
industry by creating common standards by which competitors must also abide. And for BAE Systems, the UK and Europeǯs largest arms manufacturer, as an already ǲresponsible companyǳ, the ATT is not deemed to have any effect on its operations – 
because it already satisfies the governmentǯs requirements, and the government has 
signed the ATT.68 In this line of reasoning, the values and prosperity and security 
agendas are presented as mutually reinforcing69 and the human security dimension of 
the ATT and promotion of industry interests are seen as compatible.70 The UK took the 
responsibility to lead by example, spreading the word of the treaty and helping build 
international law and good practice,71 which would generate ǲa process whereby 
everybody agrees on the basic norms at an international level which are then cascaded 
down into national controls of a high standard.ǳ72 So the self-representation is in line 
with the norms and human security argument, and pitched explicitly in terms of morals, 
values and responsibility.  
The US governmentǯs claims to universalism, responsibility and morality, 
meanwhile, were more unilateralist and interest-based in character. Its delegation was much more explicit about bringing the rest of world up to its ǲresponsibleǳ standards 
for ǲlegitimateǳ transfers,73 with its system understood as ǲthe Ǯgold standardǯ of export controls.ǳ74 The ATT will serve as a ǲtrifectaǳ of peace, security and human rights for the 
USA.75 US arms transfers are carried out for ǲone main reason: to further US national security interestsǳ – they are ǲan unequivocal signal to those who seek to counter US interests or undermine international norms.ǳ76 This alignment of US interests with 
international norms serves to elide the empirical patterns identified earlier and there is 
a clear political move at stake, which is much more acceptable in US political speech 
than British: ǲthe regulatory elegance of export control systems aside, it is the arms 
transfer policies of governments that matter most.ǳ77   
In January 2014, the White House announced the first Presidential Policy 
Directive on conventional arms transfer policy since 1995. Whilst ǲthe importance of protecting fundamental freedoms and human rights hasnǯt changed,ǳ it needed to be 
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ǲmore prominently reflected.ǳ78 A norms-based argument might argue that the fact the 
US government feels the need to reflect it more prominently is a positive effect of the 
ATT. But the government was simultaneously clear that the ATT will make no difference 
to its practice, and has been enacting an Export Control Initiative that further streamlines export licensing. )n this, ǲless sensitiveǳ items will be moved to a Commerce Control List away from a Military List, putting ǲhigher fences round fewer itemsǳ but 
also leading to less statutory involvement of Congress in decision-making and a recategorisation of lists primarily based on military threats to the US, ǲdiminishing the ability to use the controls to deny exports to human rights abusersǳ79 
A focus on two specific cases – arms transfers to Egypt during the Arab Spring, 
and intra-western transfers for use in liberal wars of choice – illustrates the argument in 
more detail. Discourses of risk have been embedded into arms trade regulation, yet the 
continuities in US-UK practice suggest that they serve a primarily legitimating purpose. 
The risk assessment process allows liberal states to continue preparing for war and 
supporting war-making institutions, capitalist development, and restricted forms of 
politics overseas and simultaneously claim the mantle of morality and responsibility. 
Krause identifies a logic of governmentality in arms control, in which forms of 
regulation burrow deep into the domestic politics of states. Accompanying this has been a ǲnormative evolutionǳ around ǲwho could legitimately use what kinds of violence 
against which people or groups and under what circumstances.ǳ80 Whilst there are 
indeed increasingly complex and bureaucratised processes of risk management around 
arms transfer regulation, this supposed normative evolution has not restrained 
historically long-standing patterns of liberal use of violence again non-liberal societies 
and support for violence in the non-European world. While the burgeoning literature on risk ǲhas shifted security away from the register of war and violence,ǳ81 the 
incorporation of risk into arms trade regulation is better understood in terms of the 
maintenance of the legitimacy of war in the west.82 This is not to say that modes of 
control have not been changing in recent decades: the shift to democracy promotion since the ͳͻͺͲs may generate ǲa more resilient form of social control than authoritarian and dictatorial rule,ǳ83 and capitalism has long featured combinations of consensual and 
coercive modes of rule.  
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The brutal suppression of demonstrations and protests in Middle Eastern and 
North African states from late 2010, often using foreign-supplied military and police 
equipment, was used by campaigners as an example of the need for an ATT.84 Seeking to 
provide a practical methodology for the implementation of human rights protection as part of the treaty, Amnesty )nternational asks ǲwhat went wrong?ǳ with arms supplies 
to the region.85 Amnestyǯs answer, pitched in terms of risk assessment and mitigation, 
provides an example of the (by political necessity) thoroughly depoliticised character of 
debate about arms transfers and control, and of the shared fiction between state and 
non-state actors around arms transfer control. Amnesty proposes a methodology for 
risk assessment based on the seriousness of violations (measured by gravity and 
pervasiveness) and level of risk. For the risk of misuse of weapons to be ǲsubstantialǳ, it must be ǲbeyond suspicion, but need not be as high as Ǯhighly probableǯǳ – it needs to be ǲreasonably foreseen,ǳ based on credible evidence of current and past record.86 If the risk is deemed substantial, arms export licences should be refused or revoked ǲuntil the risk of further violations using such arms has been curtailed through remedial action.ǳ87 
In the case of Egypt, the pattern of serious violations was such that ǲany meaningful risk 
assessment process would have informed states that there was a substantial risk of arms being misused by the security forces.ǳ88 As a result, Amnesty called for a 
suspension of arms transfers and a review of policy by suppliers,89 and for an ATT that has ǲinternational human rights and humanitarian law at the core of its normative framework.ǳ90  Given that the ATT is intended to protect the ǲlegitimateǳ arms trade, there has 
to be a way for states to be able to resume transfers. As such, criticisms of suppliersǯ 
practices are pitched in terms of the need for more rigorous implementation and a halt 
to exports until improvements are seen. NGOs campaigning for the ATT such as 
Amnesty International take ǲno positionǳ on weaponry not of ǲdirect useǳ in human 
rights violations.91 This approach stems from an opposition to the politicization of arms transfer criteria, which should be ǲimplemented objectively and fairly.ǳ92 Yet the 
assumption that objective judgments can be made, outside of interpretation, 
depoliticises what is inherently and unavoidably political. And the no-position position 
effectively marginalises the wider role of arms transfers in buttressing authoritarian 
social relations beyond their direct use in human rights abuses. Amnesty concludes that 
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ǲ)t is difficult to understandǳ how arms suppliers examined risk, ǲparticularly in the context of the existing pattern of internal repression.ǳ93 But the case for an alternative 
explanation is contained within Amnestyǯs own evidence base: entrenched patterns, and the way that ǲpolitical and economic interests have often been prioritized in the 
decision-making process over human rights considerations.ǳ94 Yet the focus on case-by-
case risk assessment assumes that human rights violations are aberrations that can be 
ironed out, rather than an organic component of support for elites and authoritarian 
social relations that, whilst undergoing transformation in the contemporary moment, 
still involve the buttressing of coercive institutions.  )n the eventual treaty text, the language of ǲsubstantialǳ risk as called for by NGOs was downgraded to that of ǲoverridingǳ risk, at the USǯ insistence95 and in line with the USǯ national approach to arms export licensing.96 And the risk of serious human 
rights violations and other ills can be balanced against consideration of whether the export ǲwould contribute to or undermine peace and securityǳ97 – allowing states to 
conduct a risk assessment and approve the export anyway. The US has a system of either weakly ǲtaking into accountǳ human rights or blanket banning, which often becomes ǲa punitive sanctions measure,ǳ according to Amnesty.98 The transfer process is ǲsubject to large executive discretionǳ through the use of waivers by the President or 
Secretary of State for Defense.99 While Amnesty wants to encourage a shift in US policy to a ǲpreventive approachǳ in which licences are denied ǲif there is a risk the arms are 
likely to be used to commit human rights violations,ǳ100 the US government claims to 
already operate a case-by-case approach in which arms transfers are always ǲthoroughly reviewedǳ by the State Department Political-Military Bureau ǲto ensure any 
arms sale is in line with U.S. foreign policy so that it advances both our interests and our values.ǳ101 So controversial decisions are not a mistake – they are the policy. And one of the USǯ negotiating redlines was that there was to be no international body to enforce 
the ATT, and that exports remain a national decision.102 Whilst the ATT directs state 
parties to undertake a risk assessment, it cannot direct them what decision to make as a 
result.  
The US government response to the repression of protest in Egypt combined 
denial of the use of US-supplied weaponry103, a pledge to make ǲadjustmentsǳ where 
necessary104, a review that made little change to transfers to Egypt105, and the use of a 
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national security waiver to facilitate the release of US $1.3bn of military aid.106 It was 
only when the Egyptian military ousted President Morsi in July 2013 that the US 
government was compelled to suspend its aid programme (due to requirements of the 
Foreign Assistance Act) but this was only partial and temporary.107 The US response 
suggests that the calculus of risk is only weakly embedded in the governance of its arms 
transfers and military aid – and the US approach predominated in the wording of the 
final ATT text. 
However, analysis of UK policy, which is framed in terms closer to that campaign 
NGOsǯ strongest version of the ATT,108 suggests that even here, the ability of the risk 
approach to restrict arms transfers is to be seen with scepticism. The UK governmentǯs 
response to the repression of protest in Egypt was to announce that it was revoking five 
licences for exports of military equipment to Egypt, as part of a wider revocation of 
licences to the region.109 It also announced a review of the licensing process, which led 
to a tightening of procedures (but not of policy). Foreign Minister William Hague claimed there was ǲno evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdomǳ110 and the review concluded that ǲthere are no fundamental flaws with the UK export licensing system.ǳ111 To enable ministers to be able to ǲrespond rapidly and decisively to the outbreak of conflict, instability or unpredictable events,ǳ an ǲimmediate licensing suspensionǳ mechanism was announced, under which ǲApplications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licences issued, pending 
ministerial or departmental review.ǳ The review also proposed a ǲrevised risk categorisationǳ using objective indicators and more regular review, to keep pace with 
changing circumstances.112 In August 2013 the UK implemented the EU Foreign Affairs Council decision to ǲsuspend all export licences for Egypt for items which might be used in internal repressionǳ, initially taking a ǲprecautionary approachǳ and suspending Ͷͺ 
extant licences, later releasing 31 of these from suspension after a review of all 
licences.113  
This four-part response of revoke, review, suspend and revise seems at first sight 
to be an effective risk-based response. However, none of these mechanisms necessarily 
stopped military and police equipment being transferred to Egypt. William (agueǯs 
focus on the question of whether specifically UK-supplied goods had been misused, 
similar to the US denial of US-supplied equipment, as above, restricts the general risk of 
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equipment being misused to that supplied by particular suppliers. This type of claim has 
been challenged for well over a decade114 and yet continues to be made. Beyond this, 
revoking licences does not require the recipient to return equipment already 
transferred; and the ǲsuspensionǳ mechanism applies to new licence applications only and does not prevent the transfer of equipment already licensed, to the effect that ǲin many, if not most, cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs,ǳ 
according to the UK Parliamentary Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC), an 
often dissenting voice in UK arms export policy.115 Despite the Consolidated Criteria and 
EU FAC suspension, the Government deemed extant licences for equipment including 
assault rifles, combat shotguns, sniper rifles, acoustic devices for riot control, small 
arms ammunition to be compliant its commitments.116 The CAEC had further reason to 
criticise the UK government after it repeatedly described weapons such as semi-
automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, ammunition and 
armoured personnel carriers exported to North African and Middle Eastern states during the Arab Spring as ǲcrowd control goodsǳ117.  
Overall, the combination of restrictions on the definition of risk, revocations and 
suspensions that do not stop equipment being transferred,118 and dissimulation in its 
supposedly transparent reporting, by a government that is at the forefront of the risk-
based approach suggest that discourses of risk and responsibility are more legitimatory 
than restrictive. UK licensing policy functions primarily to give the UK government a 
means to respond to domestic critics with the reassurance that there are measures in place to protect human rights and humanitarian values. And the UK governmentǯs 
enthusiasm for the ATT is to a significant degree a means to silence domestic critics and 
claim the mantle of responsibility in the international arena. As set out by a campaigner, 
one response to transfers that ǲOn the face of itǳ contradict the UKǯs commitment to the 
ATT and ǲrisk tarnishing the UKǯs reputation as a leading ATT advocateǳ, the imperative is ǲclarifyingǳ the misunderstanding and, ǲwhere appropriate, rectifying its positionǳ so that ǲthe UK will be on much firmer footing when championing the Treatyǳ119 – even 
though, as seen in the Egypt case, changes to its position do not involve a fundamental 
change in arms transfer practice. The UK government has simultaneously claimed that it 
will implement the human rights provisions of the ATT before its entry into force120 and 
reassured Middle Eastern states that the ATT is similar to national UK policy and ǲwould 
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not add anything on top of thatǳ or ǲmake it more difficultǳ for them to receive 
weapons.121 In the US, alongside liberal critics of government policy, there is a strong 
conservative strand within Congress and Senate, and organisations such as the Heritage 
Foundation and the National Rifle Association that are vehemently opposed to the ATT. 
Overall, however,  the main audience for US claims is friendly and allied states rather 
than any domestic constituency, according to Erickson: international reputation repair 
towards the end of the 2000s was a major reason for eventual US support for the 
ATT.122  
Arms transfers to Egypt were used by campaigners as a case of the need for 
tougher arms transfer control through the ATT. And in principle the proposed risk 
assessment procedure applies to all international transfers – so it is worth asking what 
the potential effect might be on intra-western transfers. Whilst domestic military 
production is excluded from the ATT (as it is a trade regulation, not a disarmament treatyȌ, it is significantly internationalised: the US, the worldǯs largest military producer 
and spender, is also currently the worldǯs eighth largest arms importer, importing 
weapons and equipment from allies such as Germany, Canada, the UK and other 
European states.123 In Iraq, Coalition forces caused 12% of the 92,614 civilian direct 
deaths between March 2003 and March 2008, with a peak during the invasion period, 
aerial bombing being a specifically highly lethal form of military action, and attacks 
disproportionately harming women and children.124 Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law have all documented 
drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen that may constitute war crimes and violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law.125  
Given the credible evidence (from the type of organisation that ATT proponents 
say should be used as evidence for assessing risk) that US-led international military 
action may have led to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
intra-western arms transfers should be open for scrutiny under the remit of the ATT 
prohibitions and criteria. Under the terms of the ATT, existing provisions under 
international law are used to create prohibitions on transfers under certain 
circumstances, which are allied to the setting of standards through human rights risk 
assessment to raise the bar of international practice of permitted transfers. This is 
emblematic of the way human rights law and IHL are understood to be complementary 
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and mutually reinforcing, in which human rights have been used to fill ǲan institutional vacuum in cases where the application of humanitarian law is disputed or unclear.ǳ126  
Yet in practice the restrictions on intra-western transfers are limited. Despite the 
laws, extensive regulatory bureaucracies and institutional support for arms export 
control in western states, significant political work goes into making these transfers not 
count under the ATT. The licensing process for US-UK transfers is streamlined through 
the use of open licences and a Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, for example, which 
generates blanket authorisations for transfers between them in support of pre-
approved combined military and anti-terrorism operations.127 The UK, Australia and 
Canada have such agreements with USA, designed to enhance interoperability, which 
are valid indefinitely, encompass broad authorization and mean exporters do not need 
to wait for approval before exporting.128 Through the use of Open General Export 
Licence (OGEL), transfers of any military or dual-use goods, technology and software 
from the UK to the US are permitted as part of an ǲApproved Communityǳ and as long as 
the ultimate end-user is the US or UK Government.129 Overall,  the bureaucratic focus of 
licensing institutions is primarily  on exports to the South, to the point that refusals 
between western states on human rights or humanitarian grounds are politically 
unthinkable, in line with the broader political project of common defence through 
NATO. Even critics of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan do not use violations committed 
by Coalition forces as a reason to push for restrictions on intra-western arms 
transfers.130 Intra-western transfers are thus in practice not considered to be politically 
sensitive or controversial and fall off the radar of scrutiny and accountability. They are ǲnormalized, routinized, serial moments of exception operating as part of a day-to-day 
bureaucracy whose only external audience is usually the company applying for 
licences.ǳ131  
The streamlining and depoliticisation of intra-western transfers find justification 
in discourses of contemporary liberal war-making, which are marked by risk-transfer 
and the notion of collateral damage and accidental civilian harm.132 The transfer of the 
risk on to civilians of being killed in risk-transfer war is ǲdeliberate and systematicǳ, 
according to Martin Shaw, and ǲa completely predictable consequence of the protection provided to western aircrew.ǳ133 In this, the concept of ǲdouble effectǳ has become central: the distinction between ǲthose consequences that are intended and those that 
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are, as it is usually put, Ǯmerelyǯ foreseen.ǳ134 This means that military forces are not 
held responsible for civilian deaths and injury, as long as they are not deliberately 
intended. The character of liberal justifications thus disavows responsibility for civilian 
deaths and casualties, and explains them away as accidental, muting criticism and 
evading responsibility.135 And yet accidents, as ǲboth technological acts and spaces of 
political subjectivity [are] partly productive of how these wars have been conceived,ǳ as 
Owens argues.136 This is visible in the formulations of the ATT: under the terms of 
Article 6, states must refuse arms transfers if they have ǲknowledge at the time of authorizationǳ that the equipment ǲwould be used in the commission ofǳ war crimes or 
other violations of international law; this is a higher bar than the terms of Article 7, 
which requires exporting states to undertake a risk assessment to ǲassess the potentialǳ that weapons ǲcould be used to commit or facilitateǳ serious violations of )(L and 
IHRL.137 So transfers are only automatically prohibited if states know that transfers 
would be used in war crimes and other violations of international law – but the doctrine 
of double effect makes space for consequences that are not deliberately intended, 
merely foreseen. The claim that targeting is done carefully and civilian protection is 
emphasised allows civilian deaths and casualties to be explained away as accidents and 
therefore not fall foul of the automatic prohibition under Article 6, and not pose a risk 
under Article 7. Much of the risk assessment as suggested by the ICRC, for example, as to 
how states should apply IHL criteria to arms transfer decisions, focuses on the record, 
intention and capacity of states to respect and ensure respect for IHL.138 Given that 
western states do include reference to IHL in their arms transfer policies and military 
doctrines and training, any record of violation is deemed a mistake rather than a need 
for policy review.    
This interpretive gap between policy and practice should prompt us to move 
away from an arms trade regulation frame towards a militarism frame, and start 
thinking about legitimation. The merging of human rights law and IHL tends to ǲcriminalize low-tech violence rather than high-tech violenceǳ and ǲ[legalize] military necessity on the battlefield,ǳ enhancing the legitimacy of war through the association 
with human rights.139 (umanitarian law ǲis firmest in areas of marginal military utilityǳ 
in which more technologically sophisticated militaries can claim to exercise more 
humanitarian forms of war.140 And it is a claim with political effects: it marginalises 
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accountability and responsibility of high-tech liberal states, and it pushes attention on 
to low-tech war, as seen with the preoccupation with small arms, conflict in Sub 
Saharan Africa and organized crime in Latin America in the mainstream arms transfer 
control agenda.  
Overall, then, European and US regulatory regimes provide ritualised and legitimising cover for liberal statesǯ arms transfers and wars. States with control 
systems that already exceed the standards of the ATT are known to authorize transfers 
that contribute to human rights and humanitarian violations, whether in terms of 
transfers to southern clients or intra-western transfers for use in liberal wars. Yet 
liberal states say the ATT will make no difference to their policies, and will primarily be 
a means to bring other states up to their standards. Potentially controversial transfers 
are explained away as mistakes or aberrations, if they are explained away at all (on the 
rare occasion of licence suspension or revocation, for example). But more often, they are 
justified by reference to the very existence of these regulations: the existence of a 
bureaucratic process that includes reference to human rights and IHL is taken as 
evidence that arms transfer practices do not violate human rights or IHL. In fact, the 
ATT may come to mean that potentially controversial transfers do not even need to be 
explained away as aberrations, adding a further layer of legitimation. As noted earlier, 
the inclusion of ǲpeace and securityǳ justifications for transfers allows state to both say 
they conducted the risk assessment and decided in favour of the transfer anyway.141 
The US and UK governments and industry claim both things can be true – that they can simultaneously be amongst the worldǯs largest arms exporters and make a moral case 
for an ATT – because they see the problem of armed violence as separate from the types 
of arms transfers and war-making they are engaged in. The impression that western 
arms transfers are responsible persists because of the assumption that US-led military 
preponderance, foreign policy and wars of choice are compatible with human rights 
protection – a position taken by most proponent NGOs as much as by states.142 They 
claim the mantle of responsibility by either denying that there is evidence of their 
complicity, reviewing policy but not actually changing much, or dismissing human 
rights claims as part of a war for freedom and democracy. There is a difference in the 
character of their claims, though, as illustrated above, with US claims more unilateralist and aggressive than those of the UK. This difference is in part explained by the USǯ 
centrality to the western alliance and the structural demilitarisation of the UK and other 
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western allies – the US is both more likely to go to war, and to be more aggressively 
war-like in its justificatory claims.143 The US is happy for the UK to take the lead in 
institutionalising a liberal arms transfer control system, but will do little to implement 
it, nationally or internationally.  
Conclusion: Legitimising liberal militarism  
The ATT is very much a product of its time: the fusing of human rights and IHL 
by a North-South coalition of state and non-state actors in pursuit of improved human 
security. This project occurs in the context of an international system marked by 
western military predominance: the post-ͻ/ͳͳ period is the ǲlongest period of continuous warfare in American historyǳ, according to Michael Mann, in which we see ǲa highly militaristic power in a peaceful international system,ǳ an expansive imperial appetite ǲaccompanying it of course with fine-sounding rhetoric about improving the world.ǳ144 This article has sought to examine the significance of the liberal claim to 
improving the world via the claim to the mantle of legitimacy, responsibility and 
morality in arms trade regulation. The mobilisation of risk assessment in ways that 
mute criticism of ongoing arms supply despite human rights violations, as seen in the 
Egypt case, and the depoliticisation of war-preparation that includes potential 
violations of IHL, as seen in the case of intra-western transfers and the prosecution of 
liberal wars, are key ways in which liberal forms of militarism are legitimated. 
Understanding regulatory regimes as performing such a function helps us explore the 
role they play in what Anna Leander calls ǲmilitarizing by distractionǳ ȋhere, distracting 
away from the harm and violence caused by legitimate as well as illegitimate transfers) and ǲmilitarizing by distinctionǳ ȋthe distinction between legitimate interests and the 
illicit market, between responsible actors and irresponsible ones).145  
Proponent NGOs are critical of liberal state practices that violate human rights, 
but their arguments are usually based on the assumption that their policies and practices are fundamentally sound, and that liberal statesǯ own use of force and 
transfers between them are not relevant to the arms transfer control agenda. Liberal 
states themselves disavow any impact that the ATT will have on their regulatory regimes, precisely by reference to their existing systems. So liberal statesǯ regulatory 
regimes and justifications cannot be dismissed as purely strategic or rhetorical – they 
have a strong effect, even if that effect is not towards more restrictive arms transfer 
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practices. Further, ǲif hi-tech violence is shielded from prosecution, this may sap the 
moral force of the law and allow low-end offenders to paint themselves as victims of 
politicized proceedings.ǳ146 This is precisely what happened in the ATT negotiations,147 
and is a reason for thinking in terms of legitimation. With attempts at legitimation 
comes resistance and contestation, as seen in the justifications from non-liberal states 
along the way.  
Yet the very conditions of the ATTǯs success are the basis of its political effects. 
Part of the success of post-Cold War arms transfer control has been the way it has 
coalesced with mainstream security discourse.148 Control Arms and other proponent 
NGOs want a universal system in which human rights are not politicised: whilst they 
recognise that states will engage in politicking, they hold to the idea of a fundamentally 
apolitical core of the protection of human rights and IHL. For them, the ATT is an 
attempt to engage in technical, non-political discussions with non-liberal states about 
issues such as the diversion of weapons, in order to raise the bar of control standards 
around the world.149  One of the ironies of the ATT process is that consensus that the treaty should only deal with the ǲillicitǳ and unregulated trade was fundamental to the 
degree of traction it eventually garnered; yet the productive slippage between the concepts of ǲillicitǳ and ǲirresponsibleǳ transfers means the ATT cannot adequately be 
understood as an apolitical, human security oriented agenda with which some states 
played politics. The very formulation is itself deeply political.   
Sounding a sceptical note about the ambiguities of regulation and the way it can 
create both accountability and militarization poses ǲan intractable dilemma; having to side either against regulation or in favour of militarism is singularly unattractive.ǳ150 It 
is also still quite a marginal activity: even Martin Shaw, who has done so much to 
analyse risk-transfer militarism, ends on an optimistic note that this analysis of the ATT cannot share. (e argues that ǲthe door has been fundamentally opened to new kinds of delegitimation of war:ǳ risk-transfer war is ǲvulnerable to new criticisms that will, sooner or later, challenge even its newly refined justifications.ǳ151 And the development of legal frameworks combined with civil society monitoring ǲmeans that military events 
are likely to be legally monitored in new ways. Thus excesses (of course, a normal 
product of war) are increasingly, if still very variably, capable of being legally actioned.ǳ152 Similarly, Smith argues that human rights could help ǲdevelop alternatives 
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to war itselfǳ and can bring ǲlong-term and cumulative impacts of war into focus in a way that )(L cannotǳ, including by ǲraising basic questions about the militarization of societies and economies.ǳ153 
The analysis of the ATT advanced here suggests instead, however, that it is 
precisely the turn to law, the supposed compatibility between military preponderance 
and human rights protection, and the failure to move beyond direct use of weapons, that 
helps legitimise (particular forms of) war. Critical legal studies scholars advocate ǲa 
form of law-politics to develop humanitarian principles into a concrete, normative 
agenda:ǳ154 and yet this is exactly what humanitarian disarmers have been trying to do 
with the ATT and previous arms transfer control regimes. It is important to recognize ǲthat some degree of complicity in previous social structures is inherent in social 
change.ǳ155 Price argues that scholars should not underplay the morally progressive significance of ǲpractices that at once contain elements of progressive change … yet at 
the same time are predicated on or produce the conditions of possibility for other forms 
of exclusion, hierarchy, inequality, repression or violence.ǳ156 However, the widespread 
emphasis on the progressive, if imperfect character of the ATT in scholarship and policy, 
has failed to interrogate the justificatory claims around moral responsibility that so 
pervaded its negotiation. These claims contribute to obscuring a significant scale of 
human rights violations and the wider systems of war preparation that arms transfers 
are a part of. Further, such claims are part of what sceptical southern states are 
responding to and resisting, thus making wider normative change more difficult. The 
ATT negotiation process shored up liberal statesǯ actions whilst invoking their 
benevolence and assuming them to be distinct from illicit or irresponsible actors. The 
supposed effectiveness of normative change is muted by the existence of regimes that 
claim already to exceed the standards of the ATT. This may not be the ideological 
glorification of war that we tend to equate with the concept of militarism, but the ATT 
signals the contemporary mobilisation of legitimacy for liberal war-making and war-
preparation nonetheless.  
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